This is really nice reading. I had read something about the nuclear shelters on New York City a while ago, and at the time they were built it certainly made sense that it should be so, as people within the military really believed in a possible attack from the communists.
I think this book makes a lot of sense if we look at things in the social order perspective. To plan and build a city in a way, for instance, that would enable a fast and effective intervention in case of chaos, and at the same time making it hard for those who might be thinking of disturbing the order of the polis, is an idea that has a solid rationale behind it, and historical instances to prove it right.
However, the history served implementation purposes, but when the entire idea proved itself not effective, why would military insist on it? Much like the reading from last week (which I can now safely consider the best of the entire course), it seems like the military would not like to give up their prominence in matters of social order, even if its primary role is to defend the country from external forces.
In the case of a possible, atomic attack, what difference would it make how fast people could run out of a city? It seems that, in any event, the military minds were looking at a cost management, rather than a strategic plan. By allowing people form the suburbs to run away without help, they could intervene in the most 'important' sectors of the society.
My main question is: is there something that, in the minds of city planners, would trigger a mass displacement of people in a city other than a foreign attack? If so, is it a threat to democracy as it has been conceived? Perhaps the downfall of a military urban model is not the impossibility of maintaining the social order, but the idea that urban planning is an entity that has a well-defined objective in itself, and not a developing process that involves the people that are mostly affected by it.
I might be wrong here though, and appreciate comments on this posting. I really struggled to get to the point of this book. I may not be in class to ask her about it next week...
29 April 2007
Apr 24 - Mosco
Whoa, this is way late. The end of semester is here, anyone can tell.
I really liked Mosco's work. It's possibly my preferred lecture up to this point. I know I said that before, and since there's one more week left, I might change my mind. But I especially liked his approach to mythical analysis of the society. We can very easily judge a decision-making process without knowing the rationale behind it. Likewise, some aspects of our own culture are often regarded as universal truths -- which sociologists would call ethnocentrism. The western civilization is prone to judge other cultures based on its own paradigms -- hence Mosco's myths. His view of a society that acts either consciously or unconsciously based on its own truths, and exports those views as being intrinsically good and better than those currently in place in other cultures is something to think about.
It is easy to perceive this dynamic between cultures, but what if they are also applied to your own culture? What if the perception of technology and its role surpasses its own ability to produce a certain outcome? And what about the spurious effects of some technologies, not only in the work relations (as one could easily predict), but in the creation of new "myths", and the maintenance of current ones?
Mosco's discussion on neo-liberalism is also noteworthy. Ever since the French economists argued in favor of the "laissez-faire" -- greatly helped after a while by Adam Smith's 'invisible hand of the market,' there seems to be a consensus (yet another myth) that the market is the best predictor of the cohesion of any given social system. Therefore, we reach the Pareto Optimal, and it seems that, if this is not the best overall result, at least everybody agrees with it. Which for me is not true, since in this equation labor usually plays a very small part, if any at all.
I really liked Mosco's work. It's possibly my preferred lecture up to this point. I know I said that before, and since there's one more week left, I might change my mind. But I especially liked his approach to mythical analysis of the society. We can very easily judge a decision-making process without knowing the rationale behind it. Likewise, some aspects of our own culture are often regarded as universal truths -- which sociologists would call ethnocentrism. The western civilization is prone to judge other cultures based on its own paradigms -- hence Mosco's myths. His view of a society that acts either consciously or unconsciously based on its own truths, and exports those views as being intrinsically good and better than those currently in place in other cultures is something to think about.
It is easy to perceive this dynamic between cultures, but what if they are also applied to your own culture? What if the perception of technology and its role surpasses its own ability to produce a certain outcome? And what about the spurious effects of some technologies, not only in the work relations (as one could easily predict), but in the creation of new "myths", and the maintenance of current ones?
Mosco's discussion on neo-liberalism is also noteworthy. Ever since the French economists argued in favor of the "laissez-faire" -- greatly helped after a while by Adam Smith's 'invisible hand of the market,' there seems to be a consensus (yet another myth) that the market is the best predictor of the cohesion of any given social system. Therefore, we reach the Pareto Optimal, and it seems that, if this is not the best overall result, at least everybody agrees with it. Which for me is not true, since in this equation labor usually plays a very small part, if any at all.
09 April 2007
April 10 - Neff
I can start this week's post with a quote from the book I've just read for my book review assignment. It's from the book Revolution in the Valley, which tells the story of the Macintosh. As part of the launch campaign, they wanted to get a cover story in one of the top US magazines. Andy Hertzfeld, the author, puts it this way: "Regis [McKenna, the marketing guru] and his team were experts at the delicate dance of courtship that such an endeavor required..."
Some people may not agree with Neff's views of the network in the case of the media. But I must admit that I believe that's a fairly accurate description of how things happen. In the above story, it happened that this 'courtship' with leaked to the local press, and a certain newspaper published it in their social columns, which led the executives at Newsweek to cancel the cover, although the story was published all the same.
Likewise, the 'sensationalist' media relies on solid but hidden networks of friends and relatives of celebrities do get firsthand information about their private lives, which often times turn out to be true. This is not obtained by calling such people and asking them questions, but by a espionage work that goes far beyond the borders of journalistic activity itself.
Neff's idea (quoting Kotkin) of a "cultural industrial complex" seems to be even more truthful when applied to a genre of labor that requires a lot of individual and collective creativeness. Much like learning web design requires 90% of browsing other people's websites and 10% of learning HTML and other design techniques, the existence of such complex may prove itself far more useful to those who depend on the theories and standards generated by that group than any other tool their work may require.
Sorry, I should have posted some questions, I'll think further so I can elaborate a few of them.
Some people may not agree with Neff's views of the network in the case of the media. But I must admit that I believe that's a fairly accurate description of how things happen. In the above story, it happened that this 'courtship' with leaked to the local press, and a certain newspaper published it in their social columns, which led the executives at Newsweek to cancel the cover, although the story was published all the same.
Likewise, the 'sensationalist' media relies on solid but hidden networks of friends and relatives of celebrities do get firsthand information about their private lives, which often times turn out to be true. This is not obtained by calling such people and asking them questions, but by a espionage work that goes far beyond the borders of journalistic activity itself.
Neff's idea (quoting Kotkin) of a "cultural industrial complex" seems to be even more truthful when applied to a genre of labor that requires a lot of individual and collective creativeness. Much like learning web design requires 90% of browsing other people's websites and 10% of learning HTML and other design techniques, the existence of such complex may prove itself far more useful to those who depend on the theories and standards generated by that group than any other tool their work may require.
Sorry, I should have posted some questions, I'll think further so I can elaborate a few of them.
27 March 2007
March 27 - Slaton
This one really got me thinking. I couldn't quite figure out a way in which I would respond to these readings, so my best shot is at looking into the questions that it brings to my mind -- and try to ask some of them to her on Tuesday.
I remember the beginning of the semester, when we were discussing technology instruction a while ago. It became clear to me that, having the resources available to everyone doesn't necessarily make people perform equally -- or, at least, reduce the gap between less educated students. Quite the opposite: by introducing another layer of information between teachers and students, those who are able to deal with this extra layer -- educational software, for instance -- will perform better, and the limited time in classroom will not be enough to bridge the distance between middle class and economically disadvantaged students.
For me, it seems logical that, for a profession that requires intellectual skills that, technically, cannot be acquired while in college, but instead should have been cultivated from the early schooling years, those who received better education will be far more suited. The group in question is the upper middle class, mostly white and male. Affirmative action initiatives will bring black students to Engineering school, but will not provide them the intellectual abilities they should have to perform well. That being said, the numbers of white and black Engineers is not much different from the numbers of other social numbers, such as access to health services, jobs, etc etc etc.
But then, in the end, my first question to Slaton would be: are you in favor of affirmative action initiatives in engineering colleges?
Then, I guess my other question would regard the social role of engineers. She mentions the fact that engineering work is such a technical task that, regardless of who is doing it, the result is what it's mostly about. I would say that whoever designed some of the buildings in the 'banlieues' of Paris certainly did not grow up in one of them.
I remember the beginning of the semester, when we were discussing technology instruction a while ago. It became clear to me that, having the resources available to everyone doesn't necessarily make people perform equally -- or, at least, reduce the gap between less educated students. Quite the opposite: by introducing another layer of information between teachers and students, those who are able to deal with this extra layer -- educational software, for instance -- will perform better, and the limited time in classroom will not be enough to bridge the distance between middle class and economically disadvantaged students.
For me, it seems logical that, for a profession that requires intellectual skills that, technically, cannot be acquired while in college, but instead should have been cultivated from the early schooling years, those who received better education will be far more suited. The group in question is the upper middle class, mostly white and male. Affirmative action initiatives will bring black students to Engineering school, but will not provide them the intellectual abilities they should have to perform well. That being said, the numbers of white and black Engineers is not much different from the numbers of other social numbers, such as access to health services, jobs, etc etc etc.
But then, in the end, my first question to Slaton would be: are you in favor of affirmative action initiatives in engineering colleges?
Then, I guess my other question would regard the social role of engineers. She mentions the fact that engineering work is such a technical task that, regardless of who is doing it, the result is what it's mostly about. I would say that whoever designed some of the buildings in the 'banlieues' of Paris certainly did not grow up in one of them.
19 March 2007
March 20 - Bowker & Star
In his book "The Meaning of Things", Simon Winchester tells the story of the Oxford English Dictionary and the fabulous work that gave birth to such a powerful lexicographic tool. Among other things, he mentions the perception of the Oxford's rector that the most complete and comprehensive work on the English language was a necessary tool to the desire from the British to expand their domination on the globe. In a way, we can say that he was both right in his perception and successful in his intent, even though he didn't live to see the dictionary complete. English is the number one language in the globe, in academia, and also in the technology sphere.
Bowker and Star, unlike Cortada, seem to view technological tools -- and the standards around them -- as rather political forces. I tend to agree with them. To some extent, Cortada's view is that of a historian, as well as a technical consultant. He has a pragmatic approach to technology, and by analyzing the developments around the creation of the computer and how that changed society and many economical activities, he devised an idea of the computer as being an apolitical tool that is good per se. In this week's readings, it's easy to perceive that, looking into a broader context, than cannot be so. Even the language used in the computing world is English. Programmers of any culture MUST possess a certain degree of knowledge of English, so that they can perform. This, much like the Oxford, helps to maintain the status of English as the world's most prominent languge.
That being said, one of my main questions is: if standardization and classification include values of a given culture, is that culture then gaining prominence over others? My first answer, based on the above paragraph, would be yes. The Dewey Decimal System, heavily anglo-centered, can be a good example of that. But I'd rather take this up with the authors.
Second: on page 132, the authors emphasize the need to look into historical units when looking into classification systems. Isn't this process also biased by both the researcher's background the the western scientific methods as well? For instance, the natives of Colombia and Peru do not understand and accept the private ownership of the land to this day. Centuries ago, there was no such thing, so it would be easier to understand the free displacement of tribes over the Andes and possible fights over the permanence in a certain area. Nowadays, it seems not logical to us, 'modern' citizens that this is possible. So, they way they related to the land seems wrong, immoral, disrespectful. But is it so? They classify land as something that is not owned by anyone, so they'll cross a fence without thinking they're wrong. And a researcher looking into the 'historical' unit of analysis of a given period in the past may fail to understand why this behavior happens today. Or else, he may use his own background as an educated researcher to infer that these natives haven't learned about the private ownership. Both explanations would be, then, wrong.
Bowker and Star, unlike Cortada, seem to view technological tools -- and the standards around them -- as rather political forces. I tend to agree with them. To some extent, Cortada's view is that of a historian, as well as a technical consultant. He has a pragmatic approach to technology, and by analyzing the developments around the creation of the computer and how that changed society and many economical activities, he devised an idea of the computer as being an apolitical tool that is good per se. In this week's readings, it's easy to perceive that, looking into a broader context, than cannot be so. Even the language used in the computing world is English. Programmers of any culture MUST possess a certain degree of knowledge of English, so that they can perform. This, much like the Oxford, helps to maintain the status of English as the world's most prominent languge.
That being said, one of my main questions is: if standardization and classification include values of a given culture, is that culture then gaining prominence over others? My first answer, based on the above paragraph, would be yes. The Dewey Decimal System, heavily anglo-centered, can be a good example of that. But I'd rather take this up with the authors.
Second: on page 132, the authors emphasize the need to look into historical units when looking into classification systems. Isn't this process also biased by both the researcher's background the the western scientific methods as well? For instance, the natives of Colombia and Peru do not understand and accept the private ownership of the land to this day. Centuries ago, there was no such thing, so it would be easier to understand the free displacement of tribes over the Andes and possible fights over the permanence in a certain area. Nowadays, it seems not logical to us, 'modern' citizens that this is possible. So, they way they related to the land seems wrong, immoral, disrespectful. But is it so? They classify land as something that is not owned by anyone, so they'll cross a fence without thinking they're wrong. And a researcher looking into the 'historical' unit of analysis of a given period in the past may fail to understand why this behavior happens today. Or else, he may use his own background as an educated researcher to infer that these natives haven't learned about the private ownership. Both explanations would be, then, wrong.
05 March 2007
March 6 - Greenberg
What a sweet reading!
The most compelling aspect of Greenberg's book is the way in which he touches on several aspects of the American society, en passant, without any pretense at creating the 'ultimate' theory about anything. At the same time, he offers a very broad and compelling insight on the history of a technological artifact. Really interesting reading.
Two things, in special, were very interesting to me: first, the description of the videophile community, and its resemblances with the communities on the internet. Second, the relationship between being a movie aficionado and a video rental store clerk.
The first is more a personal view than anything else. Feel free to disagree with that. What struck me in particular was the resemblance in terms of the psychological and social profiles of the videophiles and the internet chat users. Of course, the web allows for more distance and less information about one person than that kind of group did at that time. But the fact that videohiles were usually single males, 21 to 39, who rarely matched their own description of themselves was quite funny and interesting. Eventually, they would gather in those meetings, such as the one in Ohio, 1979. Also, they would talk to each other over the phone, and mail the 'video letters' in which they would show their homes. We do that nowadays with blogs and photologs!
The second, however, is very interesting in a social perspective. In the industrial world, workers lost their identification with the commodities the help produce. In the assembly line, for instance, one person tightens a couple of screws, and here comes the next pair. He doesn't identify himself with the final product. In the case of the video rental stores, that was somewhat subverted. The clerks were not only movie lovers who were amiable towards their customers, but also peopole who would enjoy watching movies all day long -- thus increasing their own knowledge about films. It was probably the closest a movie lover would get to being in the motion picture industry, and actually the last step before doing so (becoming a movie maker) for a lot of them.
The most compelling aspect of Greenberg's book is the way in which he touches on several aspects of the American society, en passant, without any pretense at creating the 'ultimate' theory about anything. At the same time, he offers a very broad and compelling insight on the history of a technological artifact. Really interesting reading.
Two things, in special, were very interesting to me: first, the description of the videophile community, and its resemblances with the communities on the internet. Second, the relationship between being a movie aficionado and a video rental store clerk.
The first is more a personal view than anything else. Feel free to disagree with that. What struck me in particular was the resemblance in terms of the psychological and social profiles of the videophiles and the internet chat users. Of course, the web allows for more distance and less information about one person than that kind of group did at that time. But the fact that videohiles were usually single males, 21 to 39, who rarely matched their own description of themselves was quite funny and interesting. Eventually, they would gather in those meetings, such as the one in Ohio, 1979. Also, they would talk to each other over the phone, and mail the 'video letters' in which they would show their homes. We do that nowadays with blogs and photologs!
The second, however, is very interesting in a social perspective. In the industrial world, workers lost their identification with the commodities the help produce. In the assembly line, for instance, one person tightens a couple of screws, and here comes the next pair. He doesn't identify himself with the final product. In the case of the video rental stores, that was somewhat subverted. The clerks were not only movie lovers who were amiable towards their customers, but also peopole who would enjoy watching movies all day long -- thus increasing their own knowledge about films. It was probably the closest a movie lover would get to being in the motion picture industry, and actually the last step before doing so (becoming a movie maker) for a lot of them.
25 February 2007
Feb 27 - Cortada
On the wake of the readings on modernity and technology, there have been several discussions as to which extent the computer is a consequence or the cause of change in society (to put it in very simple terms). Whether progress is fostered by the development of a new technology is probably true, now what kinds of forces drive the development of certain technologies is still something that allows for a lot of discussion.
Cortada comes to our help on this topic. He looks to things in a different perspective: that of usefulness of the computer in accomplishing day-to-day tasks. Which makes sense for someone who works for IBM. He points out 2 interesting consequences of the adoption of the computer in higher education institutions: first, the de-humanization of the clerical service (which he says would happen anyway due to the deepening complexity of the service and the number of people using it). Second, the rise in status, in the early 80s, of those people working in such institutions who could operate a computer.
Two points in this week's readings would make me wish to discuss the texts further: one is Cortada's explanation (or depiction) of the American society in the context of technological growth. I would agree with him on most of it IF software -- where the actual functionality of computers come from -- were not completely in the hands of privately owned companies, as well as the operating systems. Also, if OSs were more customizable and modular, and not something that imposes itself over computer users. Whereas the computer has brought significant and positive change to society, software development is still far from being friendly towards social development. Those groups, regions, or countries who are not in the game of software production have a LOT to lose, and part of their already restricted budgets was diverted to IT, therefore, to software development companies.
The other one is his mentioning of IT and faculty not getting along. I would add to that discussion that there is a culture of 'distinction', as defined by Pierre Bourdieu, which would probably explain better the situation of a faculty, who earned a PhD after years of study, having to depend on a IT worker several years younger but who masters something he depends upon but cannot really operate. This situation, to my understanding, remains unchanged. Faculty nowadays are more knowledgeable about computers, but their attitude towards IT people does not seem much different to me. I was an IT guy at a research university for some time, and professors depended upon my work, guidance, and help on several computer-related topics, but nevertheless would express their disdain for what they called "tech people", myself included.
Cortada comes to our help on this topic. He looks to things in a different perspective: that of usefulness of the computer in accomplishing day-to-day tasks. Which makes sense for someone who works for IBM. He points out 2 interesting consequences of the adoption of the computer in higher education institutions: first, the de-humanization of the clerical service (which he says would happen anyway due to the deepening complexity of the service and the number of people using it). Second, the rise in status, in the early 80s, of those people working in such institutions who could operate a computer.
Two points in this week's readings would make me wish to discuss the texts further: one is Cortada's explanation (or depiction) of the American society in the context of technological growth. I would agree with him on most of it IF software -- where the actual functionality of computers come from -- were not completely in the hands of privately owned companies, as well as the operating systems. Also, if OSs were more customizable and modular, and not something that imposes itself over computer users. Whereas the computer has brought significant and positive change to society, software development is still far from being friendly towards social development. Those groups, regions, or countries who are not in the game of software production have a LOT to lose, and part of their already restricted budgets was diverted to IT, therefore, to software development companies.
The other one is his mentioning of IT and faculty not getting along. I would add to that discussion that there is a culture of 'distinction', as defined by Pierre Bourdieu, which would probably explain better the situation of a faculty, who earned a PhD after years of study, having to depend on a IT worker several years younger but who masters something he depends upon but cannot really operate. This situation, to my understanding, remains unchanged. Faculty nowadays are more knowledgeable about computers, but their attitude towards IT people does not seem much different to me. I was an IT guy at a research university for some time, and professors depended upon my work, guidance, and help on several computer-related topics, but nevertheless would express their disdain for what they called "tech people", myself included.
19 February 2007
Feb 20 - Ensmenger
In his historical analyses, Ensmenger does a great job at looking to the greater social environment while looking at a particular phenomenon. For instance, his crtitical -- and, for that matter, ironical -- view of the ad in the New Yorker when it describes the job as being of a "new and dynamic field", and he adds: what job doesn't say that?
I especially like the way in which he depicts the need of the computer industry to devise the 'ideal' profile for a computer programmer. My question is: did they know it back then? It's quite straightforward the assumption that one must enjoy (and be able to understand) logical operations. And, as a side activity, those who enjoy mathematical puzzles may very well enjoy composing. But weren't those who replied to that ad about to be tamed by the needs of the computer companies -- IBM included?
The psychometric tools used by them to recruit people are a product of a certain period in the so called modern age, in which it seemed like science would solve all the problems of mankind. Therefore, anything that was 'scientific' per se, which includes a machine to open cans instead of the traditional can opener, was regarded as intrinsically better for whatever task it was supposed to perform. It reminds me of a certain 'battle' in the history of philosophy. Between the XVIII and XIX centuries, two German thinkers had opposing views of reality that complemented each other beautifully, but were radically different in direction. Hegel believed that the the super-structure -- the 'idea' -- was the basis for the construction of reality. Karl Marx believed the opposite: that the infrastructure was the ground for what was called reality. (This is my description of their views, feel free to comment/agree/disagree).
This opposition has fueled many debates in the past 150 years. But far from being a fork on the road of thought, this opposition and the various theories that followed it give us the opportunity to look at various phenomena and see their multiple implications. In the case of Ensmenger's studies, what this makes me think is about the trial and error process of defining the actual role (rather than the profile) of the computer programmer, and the consequences of that. As he mentions at the end of his Chess Player, Music-Lovers, and Mathematicians chapter, the programmer became a somewhat powerful figure in the companies, and his position in the labor relations within a company became a 'threat' to other people, especially those they were supposed to help by writing software. I see here the same conflict of the two philosophers: the computer programmer is the materializer of an idea, or is he the idealizer of a matter? He is to put in computer language what the manager or anyone above him tells that needs to be done. In that sense, the advertised need for a "lively imagination" was no more than a game to be played by others. All the same, he is to have a dialog with the machine and use his imagination and mental ability to guide a command through the transistors of the computer, bypassing its restrictions, dealing with its idiosyncrasies, negotiating with its unmovable structure, and still coming out with a tangible result. That requires even more than a "lively imagination", but rather a sense of transcendency into a meta reality, in this case that of the electrons.
Wouldn't a philosopher be a good computer programmer?
I especially like the way in which he depicts the need of the computer industry to devise the 'ideal' profile for a computer programmer. My question is: did they know it back then? It's quite straightforward the assumption that one must enjoy (and be able to understand) logical operations. And, as a side activity, those who enjoy mathematical puzzles may very well enjoy composing. But weren't those who replied to that ad about to be tamed by the needs of the computer companies -- IBM included?
The psychometric tools used by them to recruit people are a product of a certain period in the so called modern age, in which it seemed like science would solve all the problems of mankind. Therefore, anything that was 'scientific' per se, which includes a machine to open cans instead of the traditional can opener, was regarded as intrinsically better for whatever task it was supposed to perform. It reminds me of a certain 'battle' in the history of philosophy. Between the XVIII and XIX centuries, two German thinkers had opposing views of reality that complemented each other beautifully, but were radically different in direction. Hegel believed that the the super-structure -- the 'idea' -- was the basis for the construction of reality. Karl Marx believed the opposite: that the infrastructure was the ground for what was called reality. (This is my description of their views, feel free to comment/agree/disagree).
This opposition has fueled many debates in the past 150 years. But far from being a fork on the road of thought, this opposition and the various theories that followed it give us the opportunity to look at various phenomena and see their multiple implications. In the case of Ensmenger's studies, what this makes me think is about the trial and error process of defining the actual role (rather than the profile) of the computer programmer, and the consequences of that. As he mentions at the end of his Chess Player, Music-Lovers, and Mathematicians chapter, the programmer became a somewhat powerful figure in the companies, and his position in the labor relations within a company became a 'threat' to other people, especially those they were supposed to help by writing software. I see here the same conflict of the two philosophers: the computer programmer is the materializer of an idea, or is he the idealizer of a matter? He is to put in computer language what the manager or anyone above him tells that needs to be done. In that sense, the advertised need for a "lively imagination" was no more than a game to be played by others. All the same, he is to have a dialog with the machine and use his imagination and mental ability to guide a command through the transistors of the computer, bypassing its restrictions, dealing with its idiosyncrasies, negotiating with its unmovable structure, and still coming out with a tangible result. That requires even more than a "lively imagination", but rather a sense of transcendency into a meta reality, in this case that of the electrons.
Wouldn't a philosopher be a good computer programmer?
11 February 2007
Feb 13 - Blok & Downey reaction
The first article of this book reminded me of a time when I worked for a private high school with nearly 10000 students -- that was before the commercial internet era. They were mostly from the upper middle class families in town. To organize the personal and mailing information for all of them was not simple, since data was not in a database. However, when this process was concluded and everything was in a single file (what was not the smartest thing, technically speaking), several companies in town started to call in and try to buy that file. It was only then that the owners of the school understood that the laborious process of setting up that file had a market value. Over the years, the list was sold both legally and not-legally (i.e., someone 'leaked' that list to a certain company). One day, an individual calls the school management office offering a list of prospective students to whom the school should address their marketing effort. It was purchased by what, at the time, was a price 5 times higher than what they initially charged for their own list when they first sold it. Only to find out that it was exactly the same list, as of 2 years before.
This book gives us the clear feeling that we are in a society driven by information and technology, more than anything else. If in the earlier centuries the natural resources were one of the key elements to determine the wealth of a nation, in the later ones it gradually shifted the process of acquiring and producing information about such resources, as well as developing technologies to better (=faster, more effienciently, etc) process them.
This reading seems to confirm my personal critique of the work of Castells, regarding to the little attention he pays to role of history and culture in terms of technological development. The article from Rosenchaft seems to explore this point from the very beginning, by highlighting the role of the information 'manager' in times when everything was done manually. It would make sense to think that the development of automated systems would be a demand from such reality, and not the other way around -- changes in labour practices being a consequence of the technological advancement. It seems to corroborate Feenberg view "that technology is socially shaped."
Another concept strike me as very important to the understanding information labor's role in society: that of cultural appropriation, and the effects of capitalism and western cultural domination in the information world as both the cause and the consequence of its prominence in the development of communication technologies and the internet. It seems to me that, once again, the 'revolution' came as a result of economically driven efforts to maximize profit, more than a social demand of ways to alleviate the work burden out of the new technology workers.
This book gives us the clear feeling that we are in a society driven by information and technology, more than anything else. If in the earlier centuries the natural resources were one of the key elements to determine the wealth of a nation, in the later ones it gradually shifted the process of acquiring and producing information about such resources, as well as developing technologies to better (=faster, more effienciently, etc) process them.
This reading seems to confirm my personal critique of the work of Castells, regarding to the little attention he pays to role of history and culture in terms of technological development. The article from Rosenchaft seems to explore this point from the very beginning, by highlighting the role of the information 'manager' in times when everything was done manually. It would make sense to think that the development of automated systems would be a demand from such reality, and not the other way around -- changes in labour practices being a consequence of the technological advancement. It seems to corroborate Feenberg view "that technology is socially shaped."
Another concept strike me as very important to the understanding information labor's role in society: that of cultural appropriation, and the effects of capitalism and western cultural domination in the information world as both the cause and the consequence of its prominence in the development of communication technologies and the internet. It seems to me that, once again, the 'revolution' came as a result of economically driven efforts to maximize profit, more than a social demand of ways to alleviate the work burden out of the new technology workers.
04 February 2007
Feb 6 - Castells
In an interview for the Conversations With History Series of the Institute of International Studies of UC Berkeley, Castells said: "...as much as I think the Internet's an extraordinary instrument for creation, free communication, etc., you can use the Internet to exclude, because you can exclude in terms of the access to the network, the digital divide. But you can also exclude in terms of the culture and education and ability to process all this information that has happened on the net, and then use it for what you want to do, because you don't have the education, the training, the culture to do it, while the elites of the world do. "
It seems like, in his current work, he's concerned with the subtle but decisive boundaries of technology. Although the structures of power have changed, and the governance is not always exerted by fixed and centralized institutions (chapter 5), it seems like there are mechanisms in place to ensure that the the power is retained by the groups who benefit from it -- or would lost the most without it.
Castells' work offers, for me, one of the best approaches in terms of looking into the way society and capital interact. It brings one main question to my mind: in contrast to last week's readings, Castells' seem to have a solid belief in the social shaping of technology. Taking his quote from the first paragraph, however, he seems to believe in the existence of fluid boundaries between the various groups -- or spaces of flow -- that are maintained by those who have more at stake. Are these entities the same as before, but merely adapted to the existence in the informational city?
Although I have flirted with the Network Theory in the past, reading this book has given me a solid contact with it. I especially appreciate the fact that his work is based upon the same principles that guide my approach to questions concerning society, culture, and environment -- namely holism, multiculturalism.
Castells' interview of May 9, 2001 can be found at:
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Castells/castells-con0.html
It seems like, in his current work, he's concerned with the subtle but decisive boundaries of technology. Although the structures of power have changed, and the governance is not always exerted by fixed and centralized institutions (chapter 5), it seems like there are mechanisms in place to ensure that the the power is retained by the groups who benefit from it -- or would lost the most without it.
Castells' work offers, for me, one of the best approaches in terms of looking into the way society and capital interact. It brings one main question to my mind: in contrast to last week's readings, Castells' seem to have a solid belief in the social shaping of technology. Taking his quote from the first paragraph, however, he seems to believe in the existence of fluid boundaries between the various groups -- or spaces of flow -- that are maintained by those who have more at stake. Are these entities the same as before, but merely adapted to the existence in the informational city?
Although I have flirted with the Network Theory in the past, reading this book has given me a solid contact with it. I especially appreciate the fact that his work is based upon the same principles that guide my approach to questions concerning society, culture, and environment -- namely holism, multiculturalism.
Castells' interview of May 9, 2001 can be found at:
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Castells/castells-con0.html
29 January 2007
Feb 30 reactions - Misa, Brey, and Feenberg
When someone asked him why the Chinese civilization, being more ancient than any of the western world, never arrived in a scientific stage, Albert Einstein simply replied that the point was not why they didn't do it, but why the western civilization did. The social and economic environment that gave birth to the philosophy in Greece shaped the western civilization in such way that, for him, the 'technological stage' was a necessity and a natural consequence. In other words, Brey says flatly: “Technology is socially shaped” (p 50).
Reading this book makes me fell that we all live, as nicely put by Misa, in the “impossibility of escaping this tangle of technology and modernity…” (p. 4). That is: to think of technology (=the tools) detached from modernity (=the environment). However, some of the authors, although they mention the decisive contribution of Marx, Weber, and the School of Frankfurt to the theory of modernity, seem to frame technology as an isolated phenomenum. To me, that can't be such, since many technologies existed years (if not centuries) before they become necessary in the system in which they were employed. Galileo said: "Eppur si muove", facing the sad fact that his science did not match the social needs of his time.
Misa offers a possible answer to this problem in the beginning of the book: "The micro-approach destroys the macro-analysis of technology, since it presents in great detail the context in which certain technologies were created and deployed." (p. 10)
"The artist is the antenna of the race", said Ezra Pound in his book "Art and Physics". As such, he's able to foresee a change, to imprint his vision in some way, and such artistic expression is seen as the expression of change itself. Perhaps the blurry atmosphere envisioned by George Orwell in his 1984 didn't come to reality quite in the way he described it, are we sure that we are not recreating some of those things with other names and shapes? Aren't we fighting for or against the same values, only for different reasons? Aren't some of the techniques employed by the governing forces of that book the same we regard as being capital in our state-nations?
Reading this book makes me fell that we all live, as nicely put by Misa, in the “impossibility of escaping this tangle of technology and modernity…” (p. 4). That is: to think of technology (=the tools) detached from modernity (=the environment). However, some of the authors, although they mention the decisive contribution of Marx, Weber, and the School of Frankfurt to the theory of modernity, seem to frame technology as an isolated phenomenum. To me, that can't be such, since many technologies existed years (if not centuries) before they become necessary in the system in which they were employed. Galileo said: "Eppur si muove", facing the sad fact that his science did not match the social needs of his time.
Misa offers a possible answer to this problem in the beginning of the book: "The micro-approach destroys the macro-analysis of technology, since it presents in great detail the context in which certain technologies were created and deployed." (p. 10)
"The artist is the antenna of the race", said Ezra Pound in his book "Art and Physics". As such, he's able to foresee a change, to imprint his vision in some way, and such artistic expression is seen as the expression of change itself. Perhaps the blurry atmosphere envisioned by George Orwell in his 1984 didn't come to reality quite in the way he described it, are we sure that we are not recreating some of those things with other names and shapes? Aren't we fighting for or against the same values, only for different reasons? Aren't some of the techniques employed by the governing forces of that book the same we regard as being capital in our state-nations?
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