29 April 2007

May 1st - Light

This is really nice reading. I had read something about the nuclear shelters on New York City a while ago, and at the time they were built it certainly made sense that it should be so, as people within the military really believed in a possible attack from the communists.

I think this book makes a lot of sense if we look at things in the social order perspective. To plan and build a city in a way, for instance, that would enable a fast and effective intervention in case of chaos, and at the same time making it hard for those who might be thinking of disturbing the order of the polis, is an idea that has a solid rationale behind it, and historical instances to prove it right.

However, the history served implementation purposes, but when the entire idea proved itself not effective, why would military insist on it? Much like the reading from last week (which I can now safely consider the best of the entire course), it seems like the military would not like to give up their prominence in matters of social order, even if its primary role is to defend the country from external forces.

In the case of a possible, atomic attack, what difference would it make how fast people could run out of a city? It seems that, in any event, the military minds were looking at a cost management, rather than a strategic plan. By allowing people form the suburbs to run away without help, they could intervene in the most 'important' sectors of the society.

My main question is: is there something that, in the minds of city planners, would trigger a mass displacement of people in a city other than a foreign attack? If so, is it a threat to democracy as it has been conceived? Perhaps the downfall of a military urban model is not the impossibility of maintaining the social order, but the idea that urban planning is an entity that has a well-defined objective in itself, and not a developing process that involves the people that are mostly affected by it.

I might be wrong here though, and appreciate comments on this posting. I really struggled to get to the point of this book. I may not be in class to ask her about it next week...

Apr 24 - Mosco

Whoa, this is way late. The end of semester is here, anyone can tell.

I really liked Mosco's work. It's possibly my preferred lecture up to this point. I know I said that before, and since there's one more week left, I might change my mind. But I especially liked his approach to mythical analysis of the society. We can very easily judge a decision-making process without knowing the rationale behind it. Likewise, some aspects of our own culture are often regarded as universal truths -- which sociologists would call ethnocentrism. The western civilization is prone to judge other cultures based on its own paradigms -- hence Mosco's myths. His view of a society that acts either consciously or unconsciously based on its own truths, and exports those views as being intrinsically good and better than those currently in place in other cultures is something to think about.

It is easy to perceive this dynamic between cultures, but what if they are also applied to your own culture? What if the perception of technology and its role surpasses its own ability to produce a certain outcome? And what about the spurious effects of some technologies, not only in the work relations (as one could easily predict), but in the creation of new "myths", and the maintenance of current ones?

Mosco's discussion on neo-liberalism is also noteworthy. Ever since the French economists argued in favor of the "laissez-faire" -- greatly helped after a while by Adam Smith's 'invisible hand of the market,' there seems to be a consensus (yet another myth) that the market is the best predictor of the cohesion of any given social system. Therefore, we reach the Pareto Optimal, and it seems that, if this is not the best overall result, at least everybody agrees with it. Which for me is not true, since in this equation labor usually plays a very small part, if any at all.

09 April 2007

April 10 - Neff

I can start this week's post with a quote from the book I've just read for my book review assignment. It's from the book Revolution in the Valley, which tells the story of the Macintosh. As part of the launch campaign, they wanted to get a cover story in one of the top US magazines. Andy Hertzfeld, the author, puts it this way: "Regis [McKenna, the marketing guru] and his team were experts at the delicate dance of courtship that such an endeavor required..."

Some people may not agree with Neff's views of the network in the case of the media. But I must admit that I believe that's a fairly accurate description of how things happen. In the above story, it happened that this 'courtship' with leaked to the local press, and a certain newspaper published it in their social columns, which led the executives at Newsweek to cancel the cover, although the story was published all the same.

Likewise, the 'sensationalist' media relies on solid but hidden networks of friends and relatives of celebrities do get firsthand information about their private lives, which often times turn out to be true. This is not obtained by calling such people and asking them questions, but by a espionage work that goes far beyond the borders of journalistic activity itself.

Neff's idea (quoting Kotkin) of a "cultural industrial complex" seems to be even more truthful when applied to a genre of labor that requires a lot of individual and collective creativeness. Much like learning web design requires 90% of browsing other people's websites and 10% of learning HTML and other design techniques, the existence of such complex may prove itself far more useful to those who depend on the theories and standards generated by that group than any other tool their work may require.

Sorry, I should have posted some questions, I'll think further so I can elaborate a few of them.

27 March 2007

March 27 - Slaton

This one really got me thinking. I couldn't quite figure out a way in which I would respond to these readings, so my best shot is at looking into the questions that it brings to my mind -- and try to ask some of them to her on Tuesday.

I remember the beginning of the semester, when we were discussing technology instruction a while ago. It became clear to me that, having the resources available to everyone doesn't necessarily make people perform equally -- or, at least, reduce the gap between less educated students. Quite the opposite: by introducing another layer of information between teachers and students, those who are able to deal with this extra layer -- educational software, for instance -- will perform better, and the limited time in classroom will not be enough to bridge the distance between middle class and economically disadvantaged students.

For me, it seems logical that, for a profession that requires intellectual skills that, technically, cannot be acquired while in college, but instead should have been cultivated from the early schooling years, those who received better education will be far more suited. The group in question is the upper middle class, mostly white and male. Affirmative action initiatives will bring black students to Engineering school, but will not provide them the intellectual abilities they should have to perform well. That being said, the numbers of white and black Engineers is not much different from the numbers of other social numbers, such as access to health services, jobs, etc etc etc.

But then, in the end, my first question to Slaton would be: are you in favor of affirmative action initiatives in engineering colleges?

Then, I guess my other question would regard the social role of engineers. She mentions the fact that engineering work is such a technical task that, regardless of who is doing it, the result is what it's mostly about. I would say that whoever designed some of the buildings in the 'banlieues' of Paris certainly did not grow up in one of them.

19 March 2007

March 20 - Bowker & Star

In his book "The Meaning of Things", Simon Winchester tells the story of the Oxford English Dictionary and the fabulous work that gave birth to such a powerful lexicographic tool. Among other things, he mentions the perception of the Oxford's rector that the most complete and comprehensive work on the English language was a necessary tool to the desire from the British to expand their domination on the globe. In a way, we can say that he was both right in his perception and successful in his intent, even though he didn't live to see the dictionary complete. English is the number one language in the globe, in academia, and also in the technology sphere.

Bowker and Star, unlike Cortada, seem to view technological tools -- and the standards around them -- as rather political forces. I tend to agree with them. To some extent, Cortada's view is that of a historian, as well as a technical consultant. He has a pragmatic approach to technology, and by analyzing the developments around the creation of the computer and how that changed society and many economical activities, he devised an idea of the computer as being an apolitical tool that is good per se. In this week's readings, it's easy to perceive that, looking into a broader context, than cannot be so. Even the language used in the computing world is English. Programmers of any culture MUST possess a certain degree of knowledge of English, so that they can perform. This, much like the Oxford, helps to maintain the status of English as the world's most prominent languge.

That being said, one of my main questions is: if standardization and classification include values of a given culture, is that culture then gaining prominence over others? My first answer, based on the above paragraph, would be yes.
The Dewey Decimal System, heavily anglo-centered, can be a good example of that. But I'd rather take this up with the authors.

Second: on page 132, the authors emphasize the need to look into historical units when looking into classification systems. Isn't this process also biased by both the researcher's background the the western scientific methods as well? For instance, the natives of Colombia and Peru do not understand and accept the private ownership of the land to this day. Centuries ago, there was no such thing, so it would be easier to understand the free displacement of tribes over the Andes and possible fights over the permanence in a certain area. Nowadays, it seems not logical to us, 'modern' citizens that this is possible. So, they way they related to the land seems wrong, immoral, disrespectful. But is it so? They classify land as something that is not owned by anyone, so they'll cross a fence without thinking they're wrong. And a researcher looking into the 'historical' unit of analysis of a given period in the past may fail to understand why this behavior happens today. Or else, he may use his own background as an educated researcher to infer that these natives haven't learned about the private ownership. Both explanations would be, then, wrong.